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TOM BAKER: HIS PART IN MY DOWNFALL.
(A PHILOSOPHER’S GUIDE TO TIME-TRAVEL.)
Alasdair Richmond
Alasdair Richmond introduces some famous
paradoxes about time travel.
Many philosophers have tried to prove that something we
ordinarily think happens all the time in fact can’t possibly
happen at all. The ancient philosopher, Zeno of Elea, notor-
iously argued that all motion is utterly impossible and that
nothing therefore can ever possibly move. However, there
is another tradition, equally lively, which argues that some-
thing long-held to be impossible is actually more feasible
than you might think. For many reasons, several philoso-
phers and scientists take the prospect of time-travel
seriously and this paper aims to tell you how and why phi-
losophers think about travelling in time.
This philosophy lecturer ultimately owes his livelihood to
a train of thought sparked off by long-running BBC TV.
series, Dr. Who. The first philosophical issue I ever
encountered was a moral dilemma/time paradox in the
1975 Who story ‘Genesis of the Daleks’. As you may know,
the titular Doctor is an alien Time Lord (native to the planet
Gallifrey), who travels freely through space and time fight-
ing injustice. The Doctor has devoted much effort to thwart-
ing a race of sociopathic cyborgs called the Daleks (from
the war-ravaged planet Skaro). The Daleks are ruthless
totalitarians, who combine advanced space- and time-travel
technology with a hatred of all other life and a belief in their
own racial supremacy. They’re deeply unpleasant, in short.
(Sometimes the BBC tried depressing attempts at making
Daleks funny. To me, Daleks aren’t markedly more comical
than Nazis or H-bombs.)
What sparked my five-year-old imagination was this: fore-
seeing a time when Daleks might destroy all other life, his
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fellow Time Lords despatch the Doctor to Skaro at a time
just before the Daleks evolved. The Doctor is ordered to
intervene in already-established events so Daleks either
never evolve at all or evolve into something less genocid-
ally self-righteous. As it transpires, the Doctor is presented
with an opportunity to trigger a bomb that will destroy the
embryonic Dalek mutants and thereby (paradoxically) alter
future events so the Daleks (and all the misery they go on
to cause) will never have been. Just when the viewer
thinks all is in place for a thoroughly satisfying explosive
finale, the Doctor suddenly finds cause for pause.
Readers of a certain age may recall holding their breaths
as the then-occupant of the Doctor’s role (the irrepressible
Tom Baker) hesitated over taking the step that would
forever erase his greatest foes from time and space. What
makes the Doctor hesitate is a moral scruple: if he erases
an entire species from history, he will have effectively
stooped to genocide himself. If his objection to Dalek meth-
odology is a principled objection to genocide (full stop)
then he cannot fulfil his mission while respecting the inten-
tions behind it. The Daleks aren’t the enemy because they
look and sound weird; rather, they’re the enemy because
they want to wield the power of life and death (principally
death) over all that is not Dalek. While agreeing that Daleks
are uniquely and criminally dangerous, the Doctor nonethe-
less assumes that genocide is still a crime even if practised
against the genocidal. (A moral point that seems to have
escaped his fellow Time Lords . . .) As a lad, I’d never seen
a moral problem framed so starkly and so powerfully and,
to this day, I still defend at least the Doctor’s dilemma and
consequent hesitancy. (Thank you, Tom – my hero.)
It’s a measure of how enthralling I found this dramatic
crux that it was ages before I wondered if moral scruples
about changing history aren’t misplaced. Surely, the reason
you can’t change history is not that you might violate a
moral imperative in so doing but that you would create con-
tradictions thereby. If the Doctor did wipe the Daleks out of
history, where would the events have come from that he
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sought to change? If history is altered, the Daleks must
both survive (creating the history that the Doctor comes
from and that he wants altered) and not survive (i.e. they
cease to exist once their embryonic forms are destroyed).
Thus, paradox.
The Doctor’s dilemma involves a particularly dramatic
example of the time-travel ‘Grandfather paradox’. Such
paradoxes would arise whenever a time-traveller goes into
the past and prevents an event that is a pre-condition of the
traveller making the backward time-journey in the first place.
Imagine a time-traveller goes back in time and assassinates
her/his grandfather before Grandfather has fathered chil-
dren. If Grandfather dies at this point, then one of our travel-
ler’s parents never exists. Hence the traveller can’t be born
and travel back to kill Grandfather . . . and so on. Surely
such things can’t happen because they would violate the
law of non-contradiction – Grandfather would somehow
both survive to become a parent and not survive. If contra-
dictory situations are impossible, and if time-travellers could
create contradictory situations, then surely time-travel is
impossible. Actually, killing Grandfather is a bit excessive –
all you need for a stark paradox is a traveller going back
in time and interfering with any of the conditions needed
for the journey. Equally paradoxical is this: build a
time-machine, travel back twenty-four hours and cut the
power-supply to your own laboratory so you can’t finish the
experiment that lets you go back in time to cut the power. . .
Almost as puzzling as self-undermining ‘Grandfather’
cases are self-fulfilling ‘Casual loops’. In such cases, rather
than prevent their own occurrence, backward time-journeys
create some of their own pre-conditions. Imagine you pick
up the telephone one night and hear an oddly familiar voice
giving you instructions for building a time-machine. You write
the instructions down. The call tells you how to set the
machine so its first trip takes you back into the recent past.
On so doing, you dial your own phone number and tell your
earlier self how to make and operate a time-machine.
Nothing has been destroyed in this transaction – this is not
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a case where one past mysteriously disappears and another
just as mysteriously springs into existence in its place. But
still something feels wrong – where did the information
come from that let you build the machine? SF writers have
had a field day with such loops (e.g. Shakespeare copies all
his plays from a time-displaced edition of his own Collected
Works). In Robert Heinlein’s unsurpassed causal-loop story
“_All You Zombies_”, a hermaphrodite time-traveller contrives
(unwittingly) to self-fertilise and so becomes both her/his
own parents. (The information this quasi-cloning loop
creates is the time-traveller’s DNA.)
Faced with such perplexities, philosophers concluded that
time-travel may be pleasant enough in stories but it’s deeply
suspect logically and not to be taken seriously. Meanwhile,
general relativity and quantum mechanics began to offer a
plethora of ways in which physically-realistic mechanisms
might be created (or even exist in nature) that might allow
time-travel. In 1949, Kurt Go¨del published a remarkable
paper which described a world governed by general relativity,
wherein travellers can voyage (as many times as they like)
between any two points in space and time. (See ‘An
Example of a New Type of Cosmological Solutions of
Einstein’s Field Equations of Gravitation’, Reviews of Modern
Physics, 21, 1949.) Such ‘Go¨del universes’ are still hotly
debated to this day. Go¨del’s original model is very unlike the
world we think live in – for a start, his model-universe is
infinite and rotating where our universe is apparently finite
and non-rotating – but other, more realistic scenarios have
since been uncovered. (Often using exotic objects like
cosmic strings, wormholes or very rapidly rotating black
holes or other ultra-dense masses.) So, have physicists
cheerfully turned a blind eye to the law of non-contradiction
and learned to live with paradoxes? Perhaps not – maybe
we can preserve the law of non-contradiction and still leave
room for time-travel.
The classic defence of the logical possibility of time-travel
is David Lewis’ paper, ‘The Paradoxes of Time-travel’,
(American Philosophical Quarterly, 13, 1976). Lewis had no
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particular drum to beat on behalf of Go¨del-universes or any
other particular physical theory of time-travel – his concern
was simply to show that time-travel needn’t (always and
invariably) promise logical contradictions. How might this
be done?
First of all, Lewis distinguishes the personal time of tra-
vellers from the global time of their surroundings. A back-
ward time-traveller has later moments in personal time
which correspond to earlier moments in global time. For
non-time travellers, personal and global time march in step.
External time is like the shortest route between two events
(a line ‘as the crow flies’), whereas personal time can be a
more winding path between two points. Like that of every-
one else, personal time for time-travellers increases as
their memory-traces accumulate. Future-bound time-travel-
lers complete fewer hours measured in their frame of refer-
ence than in an external frame of reference. Backward
time-travellers have a personal arrow of time pointing in a
reverse direction to that of global time.
If time-travellers visit areas of their own lifetimes and
meet other temporal stages of themselves, there arise
cases of ‘double occupancy’ – places where two stages of
the same person exist at the same time. Surely, a person
must necessarily be in only one place at any given time.
Lewis replies: the two stages of the traveller have only
similar global spatio-temporal locations; in terms of the tra-
veller’s personal time, the two can be arbitrarily far apart.
Lewis likens the personal time of such self-meeting time-
travellers to a railway line with a trestle in its course. The
line doubles back on itself so the line which passes under
the trestle is also the line which goes over it.
Lewis takes a short way with causal loops. Any causal
chain can do one of only three things: a) extend infinitely,
b) loop back on itself or c) appear from nowhere. Lewis
thinks causal loops appear strange but are really no worse
from the explanatory point of view than infinite causal
sequences or such brute happenings as alpha-particle
emissions or the Big Bang. We have no complete
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explanation for any causal sequence (whether closed, infi-
nite or linear) and we may just have to accept spontaneous
creation of information in other cases. Explaining the exist-
ence of the whole loop may be a very different matter from
explaining the existence of any loop-component.
Lewis spends most effort tackling ‘Grandfather’ objections.
These say: if time-travel is possible, then contradictions are
possible; contradictions aren’t possible so time-travel isn’t
possible. Lewis partly accepts this argument – he believes
contradictions can’t occur in actuality. (To put it another way,
no real thing can be truly contradictory.) What Lewis rejects
is thinking that the possibility of time-travel must entail the
possibility of contradictions. Lewis says: the appearance of
paradox arises because we don’t keep clearly in mind what
it means to say that something is possible – something can
appear possible measured against one set of facts but
impossible measured against another.
Let’s consider a case. I’ve no bone to pick with either of
my (sadly late) grandfathers, so let’s imagine I travel back
in time (say from 2010) with a view to assassinating
someone I really do have a problem with. Specifically, let’s
assume my target is Adolf Hitler in Vienna c. 1910, (i.e.
long before his rise to power in 1933 or his suicide in
Berlin in 1945). Suppose I’ve done my homework and I
arrive in 1910-Vienna suitably equipped to pass myself off
as a local but also concealing about my person a powerful
modern sniper’s rifle and telescopic sight. Furthermore,
let’s assume my eyesight is good (perhaps the most far-
fetched bit of the whole scenario), my gun is loaded and
my hand is steady. So, in some sense, I do have what
seems necessary to take out Hitler. (Furthermore, Hitler
isn’t bullet-proof or equipped with an anachronistic Kevlar
vest or bullet-deflecting force-field.)
I lie in wait for my target, and eventually he duly
appears. Suppose further that I get Hitler in my sights.
What can happen next? Seemingly, my mission must be
doomed to fail – any one of a host of perfectly natural
causes might intervene. Maybe I sneeze, someone jogs
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my arm, Hitler ducks to tie up his shoelaces, I’m struck
down by a horse-and-cart, or whatever. If I am not able to
create either a contradiction or a mysterious branching of
history (more about branching histories later), the one thing
we seemingly cannot have is my successfully assassinating
in 1910 a man who doesn’t die until 1945. (Assuming
death is a one-off operation.) But provided my mission fails,
no paradox occurs. My killing Hitler is only possible relative
to one set of facts (e.g. those about my gun, my training
and Hitler’s lack of a Kevlar vest, say). However, relative to
a more inclusive set of facts, my killing Hitler in 1910 isn’t
possible, (e.g. the fact that the very same man doesn’t die
until 1945). The appearance of paradox arises, says Lewis,
because we don’t keep these different sets of facts clearly
distinguished when we imagine such cases.
To adapt another example of Lewis’s: in some sense, it
ought to be possible for me to speak (Scots) Gaelic – my
tongue and larynx are in fair working order, there are plenty
of Gaelic speakers not so very far from where I live and
there are plenty of good introductory books on the
language. Relative to these sorts of facts, my speaking
Gaelic is a distinct possibility. However, don’t ask me to
recite any of Scotland’s rich heritage of Gaelic poetry in the
original, because I never learned how to speak Gaelic.
There’s another set of facts (e.g. about my schooling and
linguistic aptitudes) which is inconsistent with my being
able to speak Gaelic. But there’s no paradox here. What is
possible relative to one set of factors may not be possible
relative to another set.
At this point, you might be thinking: this is all very well but
hasn’t history changed just in virtue of your trawling round
Vienna looking for future criminal dictators to off? Well, not
necessarily. Provided the history I leave behind me when I
get in my time-machine c. 2010 is consistent with the history
I arrive in when I actually get to 1910, it’s not clear that my
mere presence has changed anything. Suppose there is in
existence at this very moment a hitherto-unknown diary of
Hitler’s that covers his Vienna years. In this diary are entries
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like the following: “Vienna, February 23rd, 1910. Weather
fair. Persistently shot-at by inexplicable Scots marksman.
Has fine rifle but can’t shoot for toffee. February 24th. Same
again. February 25th. And again. How many times can one
man’s elbow be jogged? February 26th. Lobbed apple at
Scots marksman and put him off his aim. Scots marksman
rushed towards me with a dagger but was fatally crushed
between two trams. Rifle squashed beyond repair.” In other
words, provided the consequences of what I do when I get
to Vienna in 1910 are already in place in the history I depart
from in 2010, no paradoxical overhaul of history has
occurred. When I travel back to 1910, I don’t remake history
into something it wasn’t – rather, I simply fulfil the events
described in Hitler’s diary.
Well, suppose we grant the Lewis analysis thus far.
Aren’t time-travelling assassins going to be pretty peculiar
and thick-skinned people? Suppose it’s 2010 and I’m about
to set off on my mission to 1910. A colleague comes to
me, says “I think you’d better read this”, and hands me a
translation of a hand-written diary newly-unearthed from a
Vienna cellar. I read the document and realise that it refers
(in all probability) to what I have not yet done but am about
to do. Now here the problem of time-travel touches that of
free will: why should I choose to undertake a journey that
seems fore-doomed to end in my failure and horrible
death? Well, there are still possibilities: maybe the diary is
a fake, maybe the unnamed Scotsman isn’t me, or maybe
Hitler made a mistake and the marksman survived.
Now we reach another problem: even if time-travel is
logically possible, isn’t the above string of failures rather
suspicious? Surely, if time-travelling assassins walk among
us, we could identify them by the string of unlikely coinci-
dences they trail behind them. (This objection appears in
Paul Horwich’s Asymmetries in Time, 1987.) Suppose I
travel back to Vienna as one of a team of fifteen, all expert
marksmen and all laden with grenades to boot. Surely
Hitler successfully dodging such a shooting-gallery is too
weird to be countenanced. Thus, Horwich’s objection runs:
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even if time-travel is logically possible we can still be confi-
dent that it’s phenomenally unlikely in a world that functions
like we think ours does. However, Nicholas J. J. Smith
ingeniously replies, (in ‘Bananas Enough for Time Travel?’,
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 48, 1997).
One might ask: how likely is it that time-travelling assassins
would a) believe that the past can be altered and b) would
persist in this belief in the face of repeated failures? Such
assassins seem rather obtuse. (And in sore need of a
healthy dose of David Lewis.)
But time-travel still seems rather pointless if you can’t
really change anything. Well, Lewis also tries to clarify what
we mean by change. ‘Change’ can mean two related, but
subtly different, things. In one sense of ‘change’, we
change something by replacing one state with another. If I
take a hitherto-intact cup and smash it, then I’ve clearly
changed it – what was an intact cup has been replaced
with a broken one. In this replacement sense, changing the
past is impossible. (I cannot take a version of history where
Hitler dies in 1945 and replace it with one where he dies in
1910.) However, there is another sense of ‘change’: one
where you can change something by making it different
from what it would have been had you not intervened. (This
is what one might call a ‘counterfactual’ sense of change.)
Consider a pivotal moment of history: say Blu¨cher’s
Prussian forces arriving at Waterloo. (Generally held – not
least by Wellington – to have been decisive in sealing
Napoleon’s fate.) Clearly, Blu¨cher’s arrival changed things
from what they would have been had he not arrived. We
can assert (counterfactually): “If Blu¨cher had got lost,
Napoleon would have won”. Now, in this counterfactual
sense, we can talk of time-travellers changing the past. In
our original example, Hitler’s life in 1910 Vienna is clearly
different from what it would have been had I not gone
there. (For a start, his diary would have been robbed of
several striking incidents.)
Maybe time-travelling assassins can console themselves
thus: okay, I can’t get Hitler whenever I want but maybe my
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efforts slowed him down or prevented some of the mischief
he might otherwise have made. Maybe the effort of
dodging my rifle-shots in 1910 contributed something to the
general infirmity that prevented Hitler fleeing the bunker in
1945. Of course, it may be that your intervention makes
things worse than they would otherwise (counterfactually)
have been. Suppose I slowed Hitler down on February 26th
1910 such that the tram that gets me would otherwise have
killed him. In this scenario, it’s (partly) my presence that
makes his later career possible at all.
So far we’ve assumed that time-travel takes place within
one version of history, or one world. But what if it doesn’t?
After all, many quantum physicists think the world (and
everything in it) is continually branching into all the
physically-possible states there are. Maybe time-travellers
can have their cake and eat it too, i.e. travel in time but still
preserve uncertainty about their own futures and the law of
non-contradiction. On this view, the actions of a traveller in
the past would create alternative chains of history. So, you
leave World A in 2010 (where Hitler dies in 1945) and
arrive in Vienna in 1910, wherein you create a new history
(World B) by shooting Hitler dead. (This ‘new’ world runs
henceforth alongside the ‘old’ one you came from.) Sounds
ideal – no paradoxes here, because the Hitler who dies in
1945 and the one who dies in 1910 are different individuals
in different worlds who just happen to have the same name
and (presumably identical) biographies up to 1910.
However, one might ask: in what sense is this time-travel,
as opposed to inter-world travel? Obviously, there’s no
paradox in killing another world’s Hitler in 1910 but that’s
not what I want; I want to remove the Hitler and save my
world from the Holocaust and World War Two. Inter-world
travel sounds more like running away to somewhere nicer
than it does like actually changing history. To put it slightly
more technically: Lewis is concerned to defend the logical
possibility of time-travel within a single causal chain; invok-
ing travel across other causal chains and calling that time-
travel is changing the subject without changing the name.
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In any case, if Lewis’s analysis succeeds, we don’t need
parallel worlds to allow for time-travel – one (internally con-
sistent) world is enough.
However, let’s suppose for now that you could change (in
the replacement sense) history within a single world.
Leaving the paradoxes aside for one moment, what would
you actually achieve? Suppose I gun down the Hitler (i.e.
our Hitler – not some alternative-world counterpart) in 1910
and the local constabulary catch me red-handed over the
body. What plea could I make in my defence? “This man
here is a mass-murderer”? Perhaps not – this man here is
a mediocre landscape artist full of bullet-holes and in no
position to do anything else ever again. “This man here
would otherwise have gone on to be a mass-murderer, and
furthermore I have seen the consequences”? The problem
is: if your native history is really replaced, you can’t show
your accusers what you’ve achieved. However, if you wait
until Hitler has done something really actionable then you
may be too late to arrest the movement he started. Indeed,
you might even create a martyr and make conditions still
riper for Nazism. However, the imagination baulks rather at
killing the innocent infant Adolf-to-be, his parents or even
his grandfather. The risk of making things worse applies
even if somehow you could alter history in the ‘replace-
ment’ sense. (There’s a strong note of this in ‘Genesis of
the Daleks’, when the Doctor is forced to reveal his knowl-
edge of the future and risks completely foiling his own
mission by forewarning the Daleks against what would
otherwise be millennia-worth of coming defeats.)
Another worry is the ‘If at first you don’t succeed’
problem. So, somehow you kill Hitler in 1910, and then
another pro-Nazi time-traveller goes back and shoots you
in your cradle. Your friends are briefed for these eventuali-
ties and try derailing the whole shooting-match by packing
Bismarck off in a crate in 1840 to Bolivia so that Germany
is never unified. Meanwhile, in 1805, Nazi time-travellers
are sabotaging British ships at Trafalgar. And on it point-
lessly goes . . . To what end? Once you allow that history
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might be altered, there seems no stable resting-point
thereafter. Science fiction stories usually let the good time-
traveller win, and destroy the totalitarian enemy before he
dies, but this is just wish-fulfilment. In the face of these
possibilities, I devoutly hope that any time-travel Nature
allows is Lewisian.
To close with a final thought on the Doctor’s dilemma:
‘Genesis of the Daleks’ ends with the Doctor having
delayed Dalek evolution by perhaps as much as a thou-
sand years. Clearly, he hasn’t replaced a Dalek-creating
history with a Dalek-free one, but this doesn’t necessarily
mean his efforts were in vain. Even if the delay he created
was there all the time, part of the original history he came
from, history might have been worse still if he hadn’t inter-
vened. Maybe that’s as much consolation as exists for
anyone who contemplates history’s woes.
Alasdair Richmond is Lecturer in Philosophy at
Edinburgh University.
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